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Taking Kronman and Glendon One
Step Further: In Celebration of
"Professional Schools"
Laurel Terry*
I. Introduction
Anthony Kronman's The Lost Lawyer' opens with a conclu-
sion: "This book is about a crisis in the American legal profession.
Its message is that the profession now stands in danger of losing its
soul." The introduction to Part I of Mary Ann Glendon's A Nation
Under Lawyers2 concludes with a question: "Why are so many
lawyers so sad?"
This is pretty strong stuff. Given this language, and the theses
of these books, I was surprised that when I had finished these
books, I was not depressed. I found myself asking: "Why don't I
feel sad?"
This essay strives to resolve the apparent contradiction
between the fact that on the one hand, I recognize many of the
problems these books identify, yet on the other hand, I am not
ultimately depressed by these books. Part I of this essay begins by
providing some background on the theses of the Glendon and
Kronman books. Part II sets forth my agreement with Glendon
and Kronman with respect to many of the problems in academia,
legal practice, and the courts that they describe. Part III explains
why, despite my recognition of the problems Glendon and
Kronman identify, I ultimately am not discouraged by these books.
Part IV sets forth further reflections on the Glendon and Kronman
books and my suggestions about steps the academic community
* Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law. I wish to thank my colleagues for
the lively debate, comments and disagreement which helped me crystallize my thoughts, for
which I take full responsibility. I particularly wish to thank Bill Barker, Beth Farmer, Ted
Janger and Christine Kellett. I also acknowledge gratefully the assistance of my research
assistant Michael Gottlieb.
1. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993).
2. MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS (1994).
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might take to improve legal education. As this section explains, a
logical extension of the Kronman and Glendon books suggests
revising the framework the legal community uses to think about
and evaluate law schools. Instead of using a unitary model, in
which all law schools are evaluated under the same criteria, I
believe we should adopt a framework which explicitly recognizes
the existence and validity of two alternative models of law schools,
namely the research-institution model and the professional-school
or teaching-institution model. Law schools would then be evaluat-
ed according to their performance under the criteria applicable to
that model. If this dual-model mentality were adopted, one could
begin using the term "professional school" with pride, rather than
as a pejorative term.
II. Background
Dean Peter Glenn's introduction to this symposium issue has
summarized the Glendon and Kronman books. As a preliminary
matter, I should state that I accept many of the fundamental
premises of the Kronman and Glendon books.3 I value, rather
than reject, the ideal of the lawyer-statesman, which Dean
Kronman articulates. 4 And I accept rather than reject Professor
Glendon's admonition that we should treasure our common law
tradition and avoid having our students receive ideals without
technique or technique without ideals.' Kronman and Glendon
each took a book to develop their theses; I will not try to defend
my judgment here other than to say that much of Kronman's and
Glendon's messages made sense to me.6 When Kronman articu-
3. See Peter Glenn, Introduction: Conversations About the State of the Legal
Profession, 100 DICK. L. REV. 477 (1996).
4. KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 11-53. Among other things, Kronman asserts two
conditions that are necessary for a lawyer-statesman. First, the lawyer's work must require
certain powers or capacities whose exercise are valued for their own sake, not just because
they produce an independently desirable outcome, even of a morally praiseworthy kind. In
other words, the lawyer must enjoy and take pride in the process of lawyering, rather than
just the outcome achieved. Second, a lawyer-statesman must possess wisdom and judgment,
and these characteristics must be part of the lawyer's identity, elements of the lawyer's
personality, that bear on who he is as well as what he is. In short, they must be traits of
character. See id.
5. See GLENDON, supra note 2, at 179-98.
6. Glendon and Kronman's books are very rich and very dense. I envision my essay
as a snapshot showing some of my reactions to these books and areas in which my
experiences and conclusions are either consistent with, or diverge from, those articulated in
their books. Given the richness of these books, however, I certainly do not want to suggest
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lates the ideal of the lawyer-statesman, who embodies wisdom and
character and who derives satisfaction from the process of lawyer-
ing, rather than just the result, I believe Kronman captures qualities
that many admire in those designated as "great" lawyers; that these
qualities are intrinsically worthwhile; and further, that this model
captures the qualities to which many students justifiably aspire.7
I similarly found myself agreeing with Glendon's defense of the
a blanket agreement with all of the ideas in these books. To fully respond, one would need
much more space (as well as a background that I currently do not have). In short. I have
attempted to comply with the law review's invitation which asked me to "focus on your
experiences in any of the areas addressed in the [Kronman and Glendon] books."
7. See KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 11-53. In my view, Dean Kronman's essay in this
symposium goes further than his book. His essay, which I first heard at the March 1996
Hofstra Conference entitled Legal Ethics: The Core Issues, provides an overview of the
Aristotilian and contractarian traditions. Kronman then contrasts the role of the lawyer as
envisioned by the contractarians on the one hand, and by Aristotle and the republicans on
the other hand. Kronman goes on to analyze the central problems of legal ethics from these
competing traditions. In doing so, Kronman indicates his place is with the republicans.
When I read The Lost Lawyer, however, I did not see Kronman as going this far.
Although Kronman certainly draws upon Aristotlian principles in developing his model of
the lawyer-statesman, I did not interpret the book to mean that one must accept the
republican view of lawyers in order to value his articulation of the lawyer-statesman.
Kronman describes a contractarian's view of lawyers as follows:
A need therefore arises, even in a strictly contractarian community, for a class
of experts, well-versed in the law, who can assist their fellow citizens in
navigating the shoals and channels of the legal order. This is the role that
lawyers play on a contractarian view of their function. Lawyers help clients
pursue their self-interest by providing the legal expertise that clients lack.
Anthony T. Kronman, The Fault in Legal Ethics, 100 DICK. L. REV. 489, 495 (1996). I see
nothing in this view, however, that is inconsistent with what I understood as Kronman's ideal
of the lawyer-statesman: someone who has wisdom and judgment, and who enjoys the
process of lawyering, rather than just the outcome. As I read Kronman's statements about
contractarians, I thought of Professor Monroe Freedman and his well-known views that a
lawyer should not reveal client confidences even in the face of client perjury. I assume that
Dean Kronman would say Professor Freedman comes from the contractarian tradition, yet
I see nothing inconsistent between Professor Freedman's views and the lawyer-statesman.
I think there is a big difference between having wisdom and judgment and believing you
should advise your client on the one hand, and ultimately deferring to client autonomy and
choice on the other hand.
Similarly, at a recent ethics conference. Professor Susan Koniak expressed
disagreement with Kronman insofar as he discourages passion in lawyers. I did not see
Kronman's lawyer-statesman as inconsistent with Koniak's passionate lawyer model. That
is, I am not sure she would disagree with a model in which lawyers have wisdom and
character and enjoy the process of lawyering, as well as the end result. (Thus, even if Dean
Kronman's essay in this issue is inconsistent with Professor Koniak's passionate lawyer,
because he would not accept the "as well as" language, I did not see that inconsistency in
his articulation of the lawyer-statesman.)
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vitality and intrinsic validity of our common law tradition.8 While
I have never ended a class by singing "rowdy dowdy doodle-ee-o,"
as Glendon described Professor Llewellyn doing, after reading
Glendon's book, I agree with the spirit of this refrain, which
celebrates our legal heritage and certainly wish I had the nerve to
end class this way!9 But although I agree with much of what
Kronman and Glendon say, this essay is not intended as a critique
or comprehensive review of their books, but as a reflection about
how their observations fit in with my experiences.
III. Recognition and Pessimism
While reading Kronman's and Glendon's books, I expected to
ultimately feel depressed since I recognized many of the phenome-
na they described and agreed with their evaluations of these
phenomena. Kronman's and Glendon's descriptions of the courts,
for example, struck a familiar note. Kronman, in particular,
identified several factors in the court system that he believed were
contributing to the decline of the lawyer-statesman ideal. As I read
these sections of his book, I found myself concurring with his
descriptions and judgments. Much of what he described were
experiences I had had and issues I had thought about both during
and after my judicial clerkship and externship. These include: the
impact of the heavy caseload on judging;"° the power afforded to
judicial clerks;"' the effect of the size of the judiciary on collegiali-
8. I find Glendon's book much more difficult to write about because it is much more
diffused than Kronman's book. Whereas Kronman's book has a central theme around which
the book revolves, I found Glendon's book to have many different ideas since her central
theme was the much broader idea of the role of lawyers in the United States. Thus, I do not
purport to claim that the sentence to which this footnote refers is a fair summary of
Glendon's book; rather, the sentence to which this footnote refers is one of the threads in
Glendon's book, and the one to which I most strongly reacted. One of my colleagues who
had not read Glendon's book inferred from my summary a defense of the common law, in
contrast to a statutory approach. This latter point is certainly not what I intended, nor is this
latter issue addressed in Glendon. As is suggested later, this summary is simply meant to
capture Glendon's endorsement of the vitality and worth of our legal tradition.
9. GLENDON, supra note 2, at 177-78, 252-53. Karl Llewellyn sang a ballad of his own
composition, with this last line, to his "Elements of Law" class at the University of Chicago
in the Spring of 1961.
10. See KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 320-25; see also GLENDON, supra note 2, at 144.
11. See KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 330-31, 347-51; see also GLENDON, supra note 2, at
145-47. Although I was comfortable with the oversight I was given as a judicial clerk and
thought it appropriate, I was troubled by the lack of oversight by other judges to their clerks.
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ty;' 2 the value of writing an opinion (or bench memo) as a means
of testing a conclusion; 3 and the consequences of managerial
judging " Although some of his observations did not occur to me
while I was clerking, I now agree with the validity of these
comments. 5 In short, I both recognized the phenomena in the
courts Kronman describes and agreed with his conclusions that
these phenomena tend to undermine the values of the lawyer-
statesman.
Another institution Kronman and Glendon describe is the
large law firm. Both authors conclude that the nature of practice
in a large law firm has changed for the worse since the "Golden
Era." 16 Kronman and Glendon identify many of the same factors,
which they conclude have contributed to the change in the nature
of large law firm practice and the ethos of those large firm
lawyers. 7 These factors include, among others, the fundamental
12. See KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 342-47. Based on my experiences in the Second and
Ninth Circuits, I believe that the size of the court can make a difference in collegiality and
the way opinions are written. The judges in the Ninth Circuit certainly did not know each
other as well as the judges in the Second Circuit. Moreover, my perception was that in the
Ninth Circuit, at least some judges were less inclined because of collegiality concerns to issue
separate opinions. (My impression thus stands in contrast to Kronman's conclusion on page
342, supra note 1.) On the other hand, I also sensed that in the Ninth Circuit the judges
didn't necessarily have the level of collegiality and familiarity with one another where they
were willing to fight about particular sentences in an opinion, or cites. In other words, their
votes were more likely to be "all or nothing" propositions than they were in the Second
Circuit, a fact which ultimately does not lead to better opinions, in my view. (It should be
noted, however, that I worked in the Ninth Circuit shortly after the appointment of
approximately 33% additional judges. My experience may simply reflect the effect on
collegiality when a court must absorb a large number of new judges at one time.)
13. See KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 320. My endorsement of Kronman's conclusions are
based on the benefit I always achieve when I commit my views to writing, rather than any
deficiency I observed on the part of the judges I saw. It certainly makes sense to me,
however, that judges similarly would find that their thinking processes are refined when they
have to commit their thoughts to writing.
14. See generally Judith Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
After litigating in Oregon, I concur that on occasion, a judge's interest in expediency may
create a sense that the judge is less neutral than is appropriate or less mindful of the parties'
rights and interests than the judge should be.
15. I can now see, for example, how the age and inexperience of the clerks leads to a
particular and longer style of opinion-writing. See KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 348-50.
16. Kronman and Glendon differ somewhat with respect to the issue of how long this
"Golden Era" lasted. Glendon described this era as beginning to disintegrate in the 1960s.
See GLENDON, supra note 2, at 90; KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 50, 283, 354.
17. Both Glendon and Kronman, for example, conclude that most large firm lawyers no
longer feel they can afford to tell their clients, "Your proposed conduct is legal, but it is
dumb and morally wrong and you shouldn't do it." GLENDON, supra note 2, at 35; accord
KRONMAN, supra note 1. at 283-91. The language they use to discuss this change differs,
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shift in the nature of the lawyer-client relationship, including the
shift in the type of work handled for clients and the more episodic
nature of the client-lawyer relationship; the lack of security for
lawyers in firms; the changes in lawyer compensation; and the
tremendous number of hours that lawyers in large firms must work.
Although Glendon and Kronman emphasize different things in
describing how the firms came to be in the state they are in, it is
undeniable that their descriptions of the large firm institution are
strikingly similar.
These descriptions once again struck a familiar note for me.
In January 1982, I joined what was then Oregon's largest firm.
Although I did not experience the "Golden Age" of large law
firms,'8 I heard enough to make me suspect that my experience in
the firm was different than it would have been twenty or thirty
years earlier. During my tenure at the firm, there were lawyers
who unquestionably fit the lawyer-statesman model. 9 Most of
these, however, were the older lawyers. Moreover, during my
tenure at the firm, even with respect to the younger lawyers, I
sensed a shift in power from the most humanistic lawyers - the
lawyer-statesmen if you will - to those who were more money
oriented.
In addition to seeing the decline of the lawyer-statesman in my
firm, I observed some of the other factors cited by both Kronman
and Glendon. For example, even at my junior level, I was aware
of the lawyer-shopping that clients did, the importance of corporate
counsel, and the episodic nature of many of our relationships. I
also experienced the pressure of billing hours, which Kronman and
Glendon describe.20 Indeed, billing hours was bad enough, but
what I particularly dreaded was the monthly computer printout that
however. Kronman talks in terms of the decline of the lawyer-statesman. Id. Glendon talks
in terms of the distinction between "traders" and "raiders" and explains why many large firm
lawyers are acting like raiders in situations were they formerly acted liked traders.
GLENDON, supra note 2, at 63-69.
18. See supra note 16 discussing the timing of the Golden Age of the law firm.
19. Professor Geoff Hazard once described the "chitchat" and teamwork he experienced
when litigating with Manley Strayer, lamenting that "litigation and transaction work these
days is often done by assigning discrete segments to various members of a team without such
wasteful chitchat." Geoff Hazard, Ethics, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 27, 1989, at 13-14. I worked for
this same firm and found my experiences with lawyers such as George Fraser and Barnes
Ellis to be similar to Professor Hazard's description of his experiences with Manley Strayer.
Both of these lawyers are people I would describe as lawyer-statesmen.
20. GLENDON, supra note 2, at 29-32; KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 300-07.
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listed my hours and how they compared to the hours of my fellow
associates. This imposed a constant pressure on associates to
increase their monthly billable hours so as to avoid being in the
bottom fifty percent. (At the same time, I heard the stories of how
the partners used to meet at Christmas to set the yearly bill for one
of our largest clients.)
I also experienced the exhaustion Glendon described: during
law school I read Dostoyevsky in my free time, but when I was in
practice I switched to Dick Francis mysteries. In sum, when I read
Kronman's and Glendon's analyses of large firm practice, I found
that their observations were consistent with my experiences.
Kronman and Glendon also discussed the state of the legal
academy. Both described and decried the development in the
academy towards "grand theories" that are intended to explain all
of law, or at least a particular area of the law." Kronman, for
example, suggests that this use of a grand theory is the unstated
orthodoxy of legal scholarship today:
The contempt for prudence that the leading proponents of these
two movements [law and economics and critical legal studies]
share is an important, though unnoticed, link between them,
which their rhetorical battles have largely obscured. Indeed, so
powerful is the disdain for the claims of practical wisdom that
writers as different as Richard Posner and Roberto Unger share
that I am tempted to describe it as the central, if unrecognized,
orthodoxy of American legal scholarship today.2
According to Kronman, one consequence of the focus on grand
theories, as opposed to craftsmanship and prudence, is that "[t]he
two sides of law teaching - always somewhat in tension but
previously viewed as parts of a common endeavor - are today
more widely separated and the relationship between them has
become one of mistrust."23 Kronman finds none of the possible
21. Kronman, for example, suggests that in this regard, law schools may be more
Langdellian than they realize in that many professors are still searching for the "grand
theory" to unify the law. KRONMAN, supra note 1. at 169-74. On a related point, Glendon
praised the judging of Justices Powell and White, while noting that a writer for The New
Republic "sneered at [Justice White] for being 'uninterested in a constitutional vision"' and
while also noting that "White's offense, to many professional Court watchers, was that he
was more interested in getting each decision right than in promoting an agenda." GLENDON,
supra note 2, at 171; see generally id. at 170-72.
22. KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 225-26.
23. Id. at 268.
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responses to this tension satisfactory.24 Glendon similarly laments
some of the recent developments in the academy.25
I recognize the phenomena, described by Kronman, from my
perspectives as both a professor and a student. As a professor,
there are times when I feel inadequate with respect to my scholar-
ship because of my lack of a grand theory. I am similarly uncom-
fortable, at times, because I want my articles to be useful to
lawyers and judges, as opposed to merely engaging in a dialogue
with other professors. (This issue of the proper audience for my
scholarship is directly related to the nature of that scholarship and
whether I address the grand theories. 26) Thus, consistent with
Kronman's and Glendon's observations, I have found that one must
work very hard to maintain a sense of self-confidence and self-
worth if one's scholarship does not employ a grand theory, and if
one acknowledges writing articles intended to be useful to lawyers
24. Kronman suggests that such a professor has three responses. First, the professor can
accept the priority of the prudential attitude that informs much classroom teaching and try
to accommodate one's writing to it. But in view of the hiring and promotion practices at
many schools, he believes that many academic lawyers would choose to subordinate teaching
to writing rather than vice-versa. Second, one can simply admit that teaching rests on
prudentialist assumptions that cannot be defended from a theoretical viewpoint and look at
teaching as an unpleasant chore. The third perspective affirms the priority of the scholarly
point of view, but attempts to import the theory into the classroom. Id. at 268.
25. GLENDON, supra note 2, at 203-29.
26. 1 found it interesting that even Glendon and Kronman, who agree on so much, may
disagree on the proper audience for scholarship. Kronman asserted, without explanation,
that academic lawyers were writing to one another. KRONMAN, Supra note 1, at 265-69.
Glendon acknowledged the possibility that we are writing for lawyers and judges. GLENDON,
supra note 2, at 205-09. My own view, as set forth in section five of this essay, is that there
is room for both models. I think there should be scholarship that is intended primarily to
be among and between scholars. I also think it is appropriate, however, to have scholarship
from the academy that is both intended to and in fact is useful to the practicing bench and
bar and thus to one's students. Compare KRONMAN, supra note 1 and GLENDON, supra note
2 with Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992) and Sanford Levinson, Judge Edwards' Indictment
of "Impractical" Scholars: The Need for a Bill of Particulars, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2010, 2011
(1993).
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and judges.27 In short, the phenomenon at law schools that
Kronman and Glendon describe is one I recognized.
Kronman's and Glendon's descriptions of modern law schools
also struck a chord of recognition with respect to my experiences
as a student. I identified with the student who said: "'I was
expected to deconstruct a body of law before I understood it!'
28
I certainly had the experience in law school of thinking that I had
not .been given the basic information and tools I needed as a
prerequisite to applying certain theories. I also have had the
experience of hearing professors' descriptions of classes I have
taken in which the professor's description of the class did not match
my perception of what had happened in the class. I suspect that
my experience is not unique and that many students do not get
from their courses what the professor thinks they are getting.
Based on my experiences, then, part of me agreed with
Kronman's conclusion: "[T]he ideal of the lawyer-statesman has all
27. I do not mean to suggest, however, that "doctrinal" scholarship does not and should
not employ theory. Indeed, I believe that while it is worthwhile to talk about what the law
is and should be, theory can and should inform this decision and is something that good
practitioners and judges will use. The difference I see is the attitude towards theory and how
the author expects the theory to be used. Is the author operating as a "scientist," purporting
to observe the law from on high, or does the author try to use theory to offer some guidance
to the real lawyers and judges who must grapple with that law and theory?
To give two concrete examples: Professor Ted Schneyer from the University of
Arizona gave a talk in March 1996 at Hofstra University at a conference entitled Legal
Ethics: The Core Issues. In his talk, which was entitled Clienthood, Professor Schneyer
attempted to explain the diverse body of law with which the courts have been grappling
regarding the issue of "'who is a client." Professor Schneyer's talk and forthcoming paper
attempted to develop a theory to explain and evaluate decisions dealing with what it means
to have "clienthood." I would label this talk "doctrinal" since it is attempting to come to
grips with a specific substantive subject matter area and since it evaluates the doctrines the
courts have used and makes recommendations about how the courts should look at these
issues. Yet it would be inaccurate to say that this doctrinal research is without theory since
the whole point of the paper is to develop a theory of what it means to be a client and why.
Similarly, one of my colleagues, Professor William Barker, has written an article on
comparative tax law. When I was explaining my essay to Professor Barker, he initially
resisted my thesis that all scholarship need not be grand theory scholarship, noting that
theory was always necessary for good lawyering and understanding. I agree whole-heartedly
with Professor Barker. In my mind, one of the differences between what I call grand theory
scholarship and other scholarship is the audience. I think both Professor Schneyer and
Professor Barker intend for their scholarship to be relevant and useful to lawyers and judges.
Professor Barker has confirmed this, and Professor Schneyer also indicated this perspective
when, in response to a conference questioner who was a practicing lawyer and said
Schneyer's comments had been useful, Schneyer responded "Bless you." In contrast to this
scholarship, I think there is scholarship in which the author does not particularly care
whether the scholarship is useful or relevant to lawyers and judges.
28. GLENDON, supra note 2, at 226.
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but passed from view. Law teachers no longer respect it. The most
prestigious law firms have ceased to cultivate it. And judges can
no longer find the time, amid the press of cases, to give its claims
their due."29 Moreover, Kronman and Glendon are right; there
are many unhappy lawyers. 30 When I was in practice, many, if not
most, of the lawyers I knew were unhappy. Some actively disliked
their practices; others simply disliked their lifestyles.
In sum, I found that Glendon's and Kronman's books
described things I had personally experienced. These books had
the ring of truth. Thus, as I was reading Kronman and Glendon,
I was able to share Kronman's conclusion that the legal profession
was in a crisis 31 and Glendon's conclusion that, even though
lawyers are more influential than ever, and are making more
money than ever, many lawyers are "feeling bad when [they]
should be feeling good."32 Accordingly, since I recognized many
of the problems Glendon and Kronman described, and since I
agreed with their evaluations of these problems, I was perplexed by
the apparent contradiction between my agreement on the one hand
and the fact I was not ultimately depressed by these books on the
other hand.
IV. Explaining My Optimism (Or How the Whole Was Less
Than the Sum of the Parts)
A. Kronman's and Glendon's Prognoses for the Legal Profession
Before explaining why I was not ultimately discouraged by
these books, notwithstanding my recognition of the problems they
described, it is useful to summarize Kronman's and Glendon's own
reactions to the crisis in the American legal profession, which they
identified. When they look to the future, the Kronman and
Glendon books diverge significantly from each other and from my
own views. Kronman's prognosis for the future is much darker
than Glendon's.
Kronman's dark vision is apparent when one compares his
recommendations to lawyers with his evaluation of the impact his
recommendations will have. The first step Kronman recommends
29. KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 354.
30. See GLENDON, supra note 2, at 15, 85, 87-91; see also KRONMAN, supra note 1, at
304-07.
31. KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 1.
32. GLENDON, supra note 2, at 85.
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in response to the crisis in the legal profession is for lawyers to
embrace the ideal of the lawyer-statesman.33 To achieve this
ideal, Kronman advises lawyers to take pride in and enjoy the
process of lawyering, rather than just the result. Kronman also
advises lawyers to recognize and value the ideal of the lawyer-
statesman, who has acquired wisdom and judgment, which qualities
have become a part of the lawyer's identity and an element of the
lawyer's personality.34
The second step that Kronman advocates taking is for lawyers
to acknowledge that they will continue to want their work to serve
as a source of satisfaction, rather than as a mere source of income.
Kronman says that even as the changing nature of the profession
makes it difficult for lawyers to find satisfaction in their work, they
should recognize that the Weberian view of the profession, in which
lawyers renounce their ambition to be saved through their work,
and instead look for salvation in the realm of private life, is falsely
optimistic and unrealistic given lawyers' training and ambitions.35
Finally, Kronman advocates taking certain steps according to
the type of lawyer one is. If one is a law teacher, that lawyer
should attempt to convey to students a feel for the values Kronman
articulates in The Lost Lawyer.36 If the lawyer is a judge, he or
she must make the judicial work more deliberative by writing the
opinions personally with only minimal assistance from clerks.37 If
a lawyer is in practice, he or she should stay away from large firm
practice."
Having set out a formula for redemption from the crisis, what
was Dean Kronman's prognosis? Not very optimistic. With respect
to professors, for example, Kronman doubts that his recommenda-
tions could become the norm:
But if one asks whether there is at present much reason to
hope that this style of teaching will again become dominant in
our law schools, I think the answer is probably no. There is
33. KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 353-68, 366-67.
34. See generally KRONMAN, supra note 1.
35. Id. at 374. Kronman believes that because of their training and expectations,
lawyers will continue to demand fulfillment from their work rather than accept the premise
that fulfillment can only be found in one's private life. And Kronman believes that lawyers
will continue to demand this fulfillment, even when they know that ideal is unattainable. Id.
at 372-75.
36. See infra text accompanying note 57 for a list of the factors Kronman cites.
37. KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 375-76.
38. Id. at 379.
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much that individuals can do, in their own teaching, to promote
the deliberative ideal of the lawyer-statesman. But the current-
ly most influential forms of legal scholarship, with their strong
antiprudentialist cast, make it likely, I think, that the main
tendency will be in the opposite direction: toward an ever more
theoretical style of teaching that encourages a simplifying view
of law and the substitution of method for character. The law
teacher who stands by the view of the profession that I have set
out in this book will in years to come be increasingly isolated
from his peers. He will feel more and more like a relic
separated from the main current of his time, and if he is to
continue doing what (in the formal sense at least) he is free to
do, he must learn to do it without the hope that his branch of
the profession can be brought to share his old-fashioned views
again.39
With respect to students, Kronman doubts that they can provide
the momentum for a return to the lawyer-statesman model:
But I have no illusion that the mass of students at our best
law schools - where the leaders of the profession are trained
and its institutional self-understanding shaped - will turn back
toward the kind of practice Justice Jackson described with such
feeling and eloquence. The pressures against their doing so are
just too great. There is, first of all, the money and prestige of
large-firm practice, and the confidence-sapping conformism of
student culture itself. Beyond that there is the fact that most
of the active recruiting at our best schools is done by the
biggest firms from the largest cities; other sorts of careers in
private practice simply disappear from view. How many
students will find the courage to buck the tide, to forgo the
money, to resist the illusion of power and influence, and to seek
out other opportunities on their own when the road to large-
firm practice lies so conveniently nearby? I suspect not many.
For those who do look, the opportunities are there. But the
likelihood that the profession as a whole will awaken to the
emptiness of its condition and that there will be a resurgence of
support, at an institutional level, for the vanishing ideal of the
lawyer-statesman seems to me quite low.4°
Glendon, in contrast, is more optimistic than Kronman with
respect to both professors and students. With respect to professors,
39. Id. at 376.
40. Id. at 380.
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Glendon concludes that "[sItill, Kronman's prognosis seems too
gloomy." She notes that significant numbers of men and women
in the nation's law schools are pleased to profess law and proud to
train practicing lawyers.41 Glendon also appears less troubled by
grand theories than does Kronman, commenting that the "difficult
cohabitation between theory and practice" has matured into a
"fruitful relationship," citing several examples.42  Glendon
concludes that it is possible -just barely possible, but still possible
- that dynamic traditionalists43 are still a significant presence
among the nation's 6000 or so law professors. Thus, Glendon
concludes that it is not unrealistic to think in terms of a counter-
reformation in legal education.'
Glendon also sees the students as a much stronger potential
force for change than does Kronman, concluding "that [a] new
postideological mood is already discernible in the law schools. It
suggests the possibility that tomorrow's law students will be
rebellious enough to debunk the debunkers, intelligent enough to
rediscover the joys of craftsmanship, and bold enough to harness
the latent energies of the common law tradition.,
45
Finally, Glendon seems to be overall much more optimistic
about the chances for the legal profession. She concludes that
"[b]y all indications, the normally staid legal profession is in the
interesting state that students of systems as diverse as the weather,
the economy, fluid dynamics, and biological evolution call 'the edge
41. GLENDON, supra note 2, at 244.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 245. Glendon cites as an example Professor John Langbein at Yale who she
describes as "a veritable one-man band of creative theory and practice."
44. Id. at 246-50. Professor Glendon states, for example:
Law professors cannot cure society's ills, no matter how firmly they believe
they know just what to do. But they can cure the ills of legal education. One way
to begin would be to make our students aware of the rich web of habits and
understandings surrounding the stories of the extraordinarily diverse individuals
who are part of the common law tradition. That is their rightful inheritance by
which they can begin to make sense of their professional environment and to
understand themselves as lawyers. We owe our students not only professional
training and theoretical sophistication but the deep sustenance afforded by a
tradition with great latent energies for self-correction. Only when we succeed at
that threefold task will legal education cease to be a "feast without satisfaction."
Id. at 251.
45. Id. at 250.
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of chaos."'46 She sees this state as one that is "full of potency as
well as contingency."47
In the course of defending the vitality and validity of the
common law process, Glendon cites the work of Edgar Boden-
heimer. Glendon suggests that Bodenheimer's work may help
lawyers articulate and recognize the value and worth of their
common law tradition. As Glendon explained:
Bodenheimer had a stunning insight: the Anglo-American legal
tradition was an operating model of a form of reasoning that
had long been neglected by philosophers. He was in the
presence of a living, breathing example of the type of reasoning
that is dramatized in the Platonic dialogues and discussed in
Aristotle's Ethics. That form of reasoning was embodied not so
much in notionally Socratic classroom discussions as in the
incremental development of the common law itself....
... Over time, though, the recurrent, cumulative, and
potentially self-correcting processes of experiencing, understand-
ing, and judging enable us to spot and to overcome some of our
own errors and biases, the errors and biases of our culture, and
the errors and biases embedded in the data we received from
those who have gone before us. The wheel of dialectical
reasoning not only turns but also rolls along.48
46. GLENDON, supra note 2, at 285.
47. Id. at 286.
48. Id. at 237-39. Given Glendon's assertion, correct I believe, that few lawyers and
academics are aware of Bodenheimer's work and that Bodenheimer helps lawyers articulate
the value and worth of their common law tradition, I have set forth below even more of
Glendon's summary of Bodenheimer's work:
Dialectical reasoning is not a single form of reasoning, but an integrated set
of related mental operations. It builds on practical reason, but subjects common
sense to a process of critical examination and evaluation in which logic has its
appropriate but auxiliary role. Similar to scientific method, dialectic method
attends to available data and experience, forms hypotheses, tests them against
concrete particulars, weighs competing hypotheses, and stands ready to repeat the
process in the light of new data, experience, or insight. But unlike the method of
the natural sciences, dialectical reasoning begins with premises that are doubtful
or in dispute. It ends, not with certainty, but with determining which of opposing
positions is supported by stronger evidence and more convincing reasons. That
is what has made dialectical reasoning so unsatisfying to the many professional
philosophers who have chosen to take their bearings from the natural sciences.
Dialectical reasoning's weakness, then, is that it can never yield the
satisfaction of a mathematical proof. But, as Aristotle pointed out long ago, no
other form of reasoning is of much use in "the realm of human affairs." In law
and politics, premises are uncertain and one can't be sure of being right, but it is
crucial to keep trying to reach better rather than worse outcomes. Dialectical
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Thus, Glendon's view of the role of students and faculty in support
of the common law tradition (and indirectly the lawyer-statesman),
together with Bodenheimer's defense of this approach, certainly
reveals a more optimistic prognosis than Kronman's view.
In short, having concluded that there was a crisis in the legal
profession, Kronman seems to have very little hope that we can
recover, whereas Glendon sees the potency in "the edge of chaos"
at which the legal profession stands.
B. My Reflections on These Books: Irrelevance and Optimism
So, if Kronman is downright pessimistic about the state of the
legal profession, and if Glendon is barely optimistic, why do I feel
so good? And, even if I can understand feeling good on a
personal, selfish level, why am I not depressed about the state of
the legal profession generally?
I think the answer is twofold. First, my emotional response to
these books was primarily a reaction to the issues over which I
have some control, namely legal education. Second, although I
agreed with much of what Glendon and Kronman said about legal
education, ultimately I found many of their observations to be
irrelevant to my current situation.
Let me begin with the first point. After summarizing this essay
to a colleague, I thought "Why am I not depressed by these
books?" Even if my prognosis with respect to legal education is
more optimistic than Kronman's or Glendon's, I don't know that
reasoning is a leaky vessel. But it's what we've got. The life of the law is not
logic, but neither is it raw experience. What animates the law is the habit of
critical, ongoing, reasoned reflection on the contents of common sense.
Dialectical reasoning, with its constant, recursive self-scrutiny, also provides
the common law tradition with a limited capacity to resist, and correct for, bias
and arbitrariness. Modest though it may be, that capacity is no small thing. We
must concede to Holmes, the Realists, and the crits that the open texture of the
evolving common law does permit bias to creep in, and that its reliance on
precedent can preserve not only the wisdom but also the sins and ignorance and
power relations of the past. We must admit as well that the conclusions we reach
are apt to be flawed, due to our own shortcomings and the limitations of those
upon whose accomplishments we build. Over time, though, the recurrent,
cumulative, and potentially self-correcting processes of experiencing, understand-
ing, and judging enable us to spot and to overcome some of our own errors and
biases, the errors and biases of our culture, and the errors and biases embedded
in the data we received from those who have gone before us. The wheel of
dialectical reasoning not only turns but also rolls along.
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I disagree with Glendon and Kronman in their analyses of the state
of the courts and the state of large firm practice.
So why don't I feel bad? One reason, of course, may be that
I feel much less of a sense of personal responsibility with respect
to the institutions of the courts and large law firms than I do with
legal education. Thus, I have responded emotionally only to that
area for which I have current personal knowledge and responsibili-
ty, namely legal education. And, since relatively few of my
students practice with large firms, I do not face the dilemma of
sending them out to a life that I believe they will not enjoy.
A second reason why Kronman's and Glendon's analyses of
the state of the courts and large law firms ultimately may not have
depressed me is because I find it quite healthy that lawyers do feel
sad and that judges are bothered by their workloads and manner of
judging.49 It is true that there are problems in the courts and
problems in the large law firms. On the other hand, there were
significant problems, albeit different ones, during the "Golden
Age., 50 Before one can respond to problems, one must recognize
the need for change. Thus, since I recognize the problems
Kronman and Glendon describe (and have done so for a while), I
think it is healthy that lawyers and judges recognize a problem as
well. Furthermore, I am willing to imagine the possibility that
these institutions can survive and nurture the lawyer-statesman
ideal and our common law tradition, just as I think legal education
can do so. I would point out, for example, recent legislative
proposals amending the federal courts' jurisdiction, which could
have an impact on the courts' caseloads.5 Another example that
may demonstrate at least one court's response to the problem of
49. Glendon. for example, has said, "the mood in the profession has been uneasiness
rather than relief, a sense of being in the wrong place and not knowing quite how we got
there, of feeling bad when we expected to feel good." Id. at 288.
50. Both Glendon and Kronman noted that the Golden Age was not without problems,
not the least of which was discrimination. See GLENDON, supra note 2, at 7, 26, 42, 67, 69,
74; KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 291-95.
51. See 69 FED. PRAC. ADVISORY 1, 4 (Jan. 15, 1996) (reporting on S. 1011, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1995, which among other
things, would eliminate diversity cases for in-state plaintiffs, and Title VII of H.R. 2076,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which would curb prisoner
litigation in federal courts). While one can agree or disagree with the appropriateness of
these actions, it may reflect an ability of the federal courts to respond to some of the
problems cited in the Kronman and Glendon books. (As has been noted, however, this
solution may just shift the problem from the federal courts to the state courts, which are
already overburdened.)
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not enough deliberation is the United States Supreme Court's
shrinking caseload. It has gone from 184 cases in the 1983-1984
term to 90 cases in the 1995-1996 term.52 (Not all courts, howev-
er, have this ability to control their own dockets and this shrinkage
has its down side, including more conflicts among circuits.)
There may also be changes with respect to big firm culture.
Although I am no longer a part of this culture, I would not be the
least bit surprised to learn that the attractiveness of this culture is
changing, if not this culture itself. I think the hours, the cutbacks
in training, the lawsuits and judgments against lawyers and their
firms, and the lack of security and stability in firms cannot help but
have an impact on the attractiveness of these firms. While the law
school where I teach traditionally has not sent a tremendous
number of students to large firms, today even fewer students than
ever even claim to aspire to a large firm practice. Our current
dean is a former partner in one of the world's largest firms and
seems quite happy about the "former" part. One of my closest
friends, who was a fellow judicial clerk, recently left a large firm in
which he had a successful practice but no life. I am willing to
imagine that the few incidents I have seen are typical of a broader
pattern. Thus, I am not as sure as Kronman is that large firm
practice will continue to hold its desirability for students and
lawyers.53
However, even if the large firms continue to serve as the most
prestigious (and profitable) entry-point for new lawyers, a signifi-
cant number of these lawyers are going to be forced to move on to
other jobs. Thus, even if the lawyer-statesman ideal is unattainable
in that context, I would not rule out the possibility that in their
next jobs, lawyers can strive for the role of lawyer-statesman.
Furthermore, even if I am wrong, only one-third of lawyers begin
their careers with large firms54 and, depending on which study you
52. Compare 54 U.S.L.W. 3038 (July 30, 1985) with 65 U.S.L.W. 3100 (Aug. 6, 1996).
53. A major countervailing pressure, however, is money. Entry-level positions in large
firms continue to be the most lucrative, which is undoubtedly tempting to students carrying
increasingly heavier debt-loads. See Katherine A. Tongue, Law Degrees on Debt: Today's
Law Students Are Graduating with Record Level of Debt, OR. ST. B. BULL., Nov. 1995, at
9 (noting that over half of the nation's law school graduates have incurred educational debts
between $40,000 and $79,000); see also Christine K. Schroeder, In Debt to the Law, PA.
LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 27.
54. See LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT- AN EDUCATIONAL
CONTINUUM 76 (Robert MacCrate ed., student ed. 1992) (reporting that approximately 30%
of the class of 1990 went into firms with more than 100 lawyers).
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accept, somewhere between ten and twenty percent of lawyers
practice in large firms.5 And thus, even if the lawyer-statesman
ideal is dead in the large firm practice, I am not sure it follows that
it is dead in all other contexts.
In short, I wasn't depressed by Kronman's and Glendon's
observations about the courts and large law firms because I am
willing to trust that the courts and practicing lawyers will be able
to sort out many of their problems. As a result, I am willing to
limit my emotional responses to those critiques directed towards
legal education.
Turning to Glendon's and Kronman's critiques of legal
education, I was not depressed by their books simply because so
much of what they said seems irrelevant to my teaching, my life,
and my students. I suspect that Kronman's advice to law professors
will sound, to many law professors, like a description of what they
are trying to do:
What should a lawyer who insists on honestly confronting this
predicament do?
If he is a law teacher, he should attempt to convey to his
students some feeling for the values I have defended in this
book. At an individual level, this is a reasonable goal to
pursue. In contrast to both judges and practitioners, law
teachers have a great deal of control over their own work.
Generally speaking, they are free to write about what they wish,
and have substantial freedom too in defining the content and
character of the courses they teach. This means that law
teachers who share my point of view will find in the classroom
considerable opportunity to act on their beliefs. They will use
this freedom to combat the idea that the law becomes interest-
ing or intelligible only when seen from the standpoint of
another field; to discredit the claim that one cannot participate
in its culture without having first mastered the idiom and
techniques of some more rigorous nonlegal discipline, such as
philosophy or economics; and, above all, to discourage the
belief that behind the surface chaos of the law there are simple
organizing structures that it is the chief object of law study to
describe in an abstract way.
55. Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Legal Education and Entry into the
Legal Profession: The Role of Race, Gender, and Education Debt, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 829,
839 (1995) (citations omitted).
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More positively, they will use the freedom of the classroom
to stress the importance of individual cases. They will try to
show that the analysis of cases is challenging and fun and,
though it cannot be reduced to a method, that there are better
and worse ways of doing it. They may make use, from time to
time, of other disciplines. But if they do, they will be sure to
emphasize that the role these disciplines play in the analysis of
cases is a subordinate one whose scope is a matter of judgment
that the disciplines in question cannot settle on their own. They
will insist on the peculiarity of cases, on their idiosyncrasies, and
on the complexity of the world - on its factual complexity, but
more important, on its moral and spiritual complexity, on the
plurality of incommensurable values that fight for recognition
in the law as in other spheres of life. They will encourage their
students to think of the law as an independent discipline, with
demands and satisfactions of its own, and not merely as the
action arm of some more comprehensive policy science. Of
course they will stress the need for lawyers to serve the public
good and will remind their students that they have a responsi-
bility to take an interest in the well-being of the legal system as
a whole. But they will also make it clear that they believe no
technique is sufficient to fulfill this trust, that wisdom is
required too, and that wisdom is a trait of character and not of
intellect alone. All of this they will teach their students,
sometimes explicitly but more often by the way they approach
their subject and what they emphasize in it. The freedom of
the classroom gives them an opportunity to make these points,
and if the question is whether a teacher who cares about the
values affirmed by the ideal of the lawyer-statesman can seize
this opportunity and use it to good effect, I am confident that
the answer is yes, for I have seen some of my own teachers do
it.56
56. KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 375-76.
Judging by the professors Glendon lauded, I believe that she would not disagree with
this advice. Note, for example, her descriptions of the work of Professors Elizabeth Warren.
Phillip Areeda, John Langbein and Archibald Cox. GLENDON, supra note 2, at 248-53.
Glendon seems, however, to articulate a greater role for theory in the classroom than does
Kronman, although I am not sure Kronman would disagree with the "theory" sections of
Glendon's book. Compare id. at 249 ("If we are hopeful, we may anticipate, too, that
insights from those disciplines will aid law professors in preparing their students for roles in
a society that urgently needs specialists in long-range planning, imaginative problem solving,
legislation, regulation, and institutions.") with KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 356; see generally
id. at 354-64.
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Kronman's advice comes fairly close to what I aspire to do in
the classroom, even if I may not always achieve it. I do not have
the perspective that law is only interesting or intelligible when seen
from the standpoint of another field, nor do I argue that behind the
surface chaos of the law, there are simple organizing structures and
that it is the chief object of law study to describe this in an abstract
way. (Among other reasons, I do not do this because I have not
mastered the idiom and technique of a nonlegal discipline.) I hope
that I convey to my students that the analysis of cases can be
challenging and fun. I try to stress the peculiarity of cases,
including their factual complexity, their moral and spiritual
complexity, and the plurality of incommensurable values fighting
for recognition in the law. I also try to stress the duty to serve the
public good and the fact that good lawyering requires wisdom and
judgment and communication, among other things. In other words,
I embrace Kronman's advice as a goal to which to aspire.
Furthermore, I believe that I am not alone on my faculty in
these aspirations. I believe my colleagues share the ethos that is
implicit in Kronman's advice. We are willing to acknowledge that
we are training students to become lawyers, many of whom will
practice law. We want our students to enjoy the law, and we want
them to be good at it.57 And, at the risk of sounding immodest,
I think we enjoy teaching them and are successful at it.
In short, I ultimately did not find the Kronman and Glendon
books depressing because I felt that their critiques of legal
education were, to a large extent, irrelevant to my reality; indeed,
their aspirations describe the reality I do see. Thus, although I
could recognize and agree with the parts of the reality Kronman
57. In my view, we are thus trying to inculcate one of the conditions Kronman thought
was necessary for the lawyer-statesman, namely that he enjoy the process itself, rather than
merely valuing it because it leads to a morally desirable end. Moreover, I think it is possible
to inculcate this value even in students who come to law school for lack of anything better
to do. Glendon observed that the nature of legal education changed as the nature of the
students changed. Among other things, she states: "By the 1970s, law school had become
the place for a bright, upper-middle-class liberal arts major to go when he still had no idea
of what he wanted to do in life." GLENDON, supra note 2, at 201. Glendon's description
certainly fits my own decision to attend law school. Despite these reasons for attending law
school, I liked law school, I liked law, and I liked lawyering. Thus, while Glendon's
observations may be accurate with respect to the changing nature of law students and legal
education, I do not think it follows that a law school cannot teach its students to enjoy the
process of lawyering as an end in itself. In short, I think students can learn these values
Kronman describes.
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and Glendon describe, somehow the sum of those parts, based on
the reality of my experiences, was quite different.
V. Taking Kronman and Glendon One Step Further: In
Celebration of the "Teaching Institution" Professional
School
So, where do these reflections leave me? In what might seem
like a complete switch of gears, I found myself thinking about the
law school ranking structure used in the annual US. News and
World Report Graduate Schools issue.58  US. News uses a unitary
model for ranking law schools, in which it assumes that it is
appropriate to compare all law schools to one another, and that
one can ultimately rank them on a continuum from top to bottom.
This unitary model methodology which US. News uses for
evaluation of law schools stands in contrast to the methodology
US. News uses for ranking medical schools. In the same issues in
which it ranked law schools along a single continuum, US. News
has distinguished between research-oriented medical schools and
other medical schools.59 Thus, US. News implicitly has recognized
there are multiple acceptable models of what a medical school
should be and has further assumed that it is appropriate to evaluate
medical schools differently depending on the school's goal. The
ranking of medical schools is thus similar to its ranking of colleges,
in which US. News distinguishes between small liberal arts colleges
and large (research) universities, and evaluates them differently.
I submit that: (1) US. News' use of a unitary evaluation
system for law schools reflects the way lawyers, judges, academics
and even Kronman and Glendon tend to think about and "rank"
law schools; (2) that this unitary evaluation system contributes to
part of the problem Kronman and Glendon describe; and (3) that
the legal profession generally, and legal education specifically,
would be much healthier if we (and US. News) began to recognize
58. See, e.g., America's Best Graduate Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 18,
1996, at 82.
59. See id. at 96 (distinguishing between "research-oriented" medical schools and
"primary care" schools). Compare id. with 1993 Best Graduate Schools, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Mar. 22, 1993, at 72-73 (distinguishing between "the top research schools" and
"comprehensive schools"). While the methodology for allocating schools in one category or
another has changed, and may need work, the point is clear that at least with respect to
medical schools, U.S. News concluded that it is appropriate to evaluate medical schools
differently depending on what the school's goal is and to recognize that there are multiple
acceptable models of what a medical school should be.
1996]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
that as with medical schools and colleges, there are multiple
acceptable models of law schools and that it is appropriate to
evaluate schools differently depending on the model a law school
follows. In short, as this section explains, we should take Glendon
and Kronman one step further and begin to celebrate the profes-
sional school model of law school, which I will also refer to as the
teaching institution model.
Let me address each of these three propositions in turn. With
respect to the first assertion - that we use a unitary evaluation
system for law schools in this country - I offer no support other
than the US. News article, the lack of protest over the article's
organization, and my own observations that the legal community
assumes that one can discuss law schools on a single continuum.
Secondly, I think using an unitary model method to evaluate
law schools contributes to the problems Glendon and Kronman
describe because it implicitly devalues the development of the
individual student and his or her lawyering skills. The legal
community is constantly told that the "profession"-oriented schools
come out on the bottom of the continuum of quality evaluation.
Glendon, for example, states: "It is commonly believed that
second- and third-tier law schools are more profession-oriented
than elite law schools, but the fact is that homogenizing forces are
at work, with varying degrees of strength, throughout legal
education."' 6  In other words, if a school does not want to be
perceived as being second or third rate, there is pressure to avoid
acquiring a reputation as a profession-oriented school, which
focuses on teaching individual students to become lawyers.
Obviously, historical fact is one reason why "it is commonly
believed" that second- and third-tier schools are more profession-
oriented than elite law schools. More insidiously, however, I
believe that the unitary model of ranking law schools contributes
to the belief that if a law school is profession-oriented, then it must
be second or third rate.
Think of the unitary model for evaluating law schools. What
is at the bottom of the continuum? I suggest that the answer is
"mere trade schools.",61  Yet, what is a trade school? I suggest
60. GLENDON, supra note 2, at 218.
61. Glendon, for example, states:
The movement of legal education into university settings had brought
together two sorts of learning that did not sit easily with each other: practical
vocational training and the freewheeling pursuit of knowledge. Langdell and his
[Vol. 100:3
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that it is a school that accomplishes some, but not all, of the goals
of a professional school.62 Thus, a law school that is evaluated on
a single continuum, and that shares some of the same traits as the
lowest-ranked institutions, is likely to be rated lower than an
institution that shares fewer of those traits. In other words,
because of what we have defined as the "evil" to avoid, profession-
followers had foreseen a happy accommodation at a middling level of theory. The
better law schools would not be mere trade schools, but neither would they be
ivory towers. Law professors would serve the profession and the academy alike
by historical investigation, systematization, and explication of the law.
Id. at 185 (emphasis added).
62. As stated earlier, a law school that uses a teaching institution or professional school
model focuses on the development of the individual student. These students, who are soon
to be lawyers, ideally should leave the institution with the following: (1) mastery of a certain
body of knowledge; (2) mastery of a certain set of skills; (3) an intellectual curiosity or sense
of professional duty, which will cause the new lawyer to remain current: (4) a love of the
craft, or sense of professional duty, which will cause the new lawyer to hold him/herself to
high professional standards; (5) a sense of the lawyer's special role in pursuing a just society;
(6) a sense of the importance of public service; and (7) familiarity with, or at least knowledge
about, the grand theories coupled with the intellectual tools necessary to discern their proper
role in legal and professional discourse. (Kronman presumably would include the character
traits of judgment and wisdom, although I don't know that he would think that a student will
leave law school having acquired these traits.)
The original title of the essay was Taking Kronman and Glendon One Step Further:
In Celebration of "Trade Schools." In early drafts, I deliberately and provocatively embraced
the term "trade school" because I think the academy's almost universal use of this term as
a perjorative subtly undermines our acceptance of the teaching institution model.
As used by Glendon, I think the term "trade school" is worthy of its negative
connotation. Glendon defines trade schools as those in which students are simply drilled on
rules and doctrines that can be swept away by tomorrow's legislation or decisions.
GLENDON, supra note 2, at 222. In other words, Glendon defines a trade school as a school
that is limited to item 1, above, or at most, items 1 and 2. I can't imagine a single legal
educator or law school, however, that would consciously limit itself to accomplishing items
1 and 2 above. Moreover, I think that in the legal academy, the pejorative "trade school"
has unfortunately come to be used without the precise definition Glendon uses. By retaining
"trade school" as a pejorative within the academy, we subtly reinforce the idea that focusing
on the development of the individual student by teaching doctrine and skills somehow
diminishes rather than enhances a law school. It is my perception that the pejorative "mere
trade school" thus reflects a denigration of even those institutions that try to accomplish
items 1-7 above, not just items 1 and 2. I would like the legal academy to abandon the term
"trade school" as its pejorative because of the spillover effects.
I initially hoped that if I proudly embraced the term "trade school" (and was willing
to put my money where my mouth was by having this article title on my CV), it would be
a step towards acceptance of an alternative model of law school, focused on the development
of the individual student.
I ultimately decided not to embrace the term "trade school," however, since it has so
much baggage (including images of green grocers) and since some people might infer that
I am advocating an alternative model in which an institution strives only for item 1, or at
most. items 1 and 2. (I am indebted to Ted Janger for helping me articulate our differing
views of "trade schools," which ultimately led me to abandon the term.)
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oriented schools are likely to continue to rank lower than research-
oriented schools.
Using a single continuum for evaluating legal education thus
creates a tension in those legal educators who, on the one hand,
want to prepare their students for their profession in the manner
Kronman suggested in part IV. B, and who, on the other hand,
would naturally prefer not to have to think of themselves as being
at the bottom of the continuum of legal education.
So, what would I like to see? I would like the legal academy
to recognize and take pride in multiple models of legal education.
We must learn, for example, to think of the "teaching institution"
law school as an alternative model to the research institution law
school, rather than an example of an institution on the lower end
of the law school quality continuum. In other words, we must learn
to value the teaching institution law school as a different kind of
institution, rather than a different quality of institution.63
When I suggested to some of my colleagues that we should use
alternative models for thinking about law schools, not all were
convinced. Some of these colleagues believe the unitary model is
the better approach since all law school faculties engage in both
teaching and research, although the emphases may differ. They
cited examples of institutions that they believe provide excellent
scholarship and teaching and asked me to "categorize" such
institutions.
On the one hand, I agree that all law schools should have
faculty who engage in both scholarship, teaching, and service; this
fact may suggest that a unitary model is appropriate. On the other
hand, I cannot escape my sense that there is a fundamental
difference between law schools that are primarily research
institutions and law schools that are primarily teaching institutions.
I think different schools ultimately have different priorities and
must act on those priorities.
A teaching institution's priority is the personal development of
the individual student and future lawyer. This priority will be
reflected in numerous ways such as the access of the students to the
63. As an aside, it seems to me that there clearly is a need for law schools modeled on
the research institution model and also on the professional or teaching institution model. As
to balance, however, I believe that as a practical matter, we need more professional schools
than we do research institutions.
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faculty, the types of experiences the school provides to the student
(which likely are more labor-intensive for full-time tenure-track
faculty), the frequency and importance of teaching reviews by
colleagues, the opportunity for student feedback on teaching, and
the faculty's development of their own or supplemental course
materials. In my vision of the teaching institution, faculty engage
in scholarship and embrace theory. The orientation of such
research and theory, however, may be different than in a research
institution. Research and theory are valued, among other reasons,
because they support the teaching institution's mission of develop-
ing the individual student and future lawyer. Research and theory
add value to one's own teaching and add value to the student who
is soon to become a lawyer.64
In contrast to this teaching institution model, I sense that there
are research institutions where the focus is just that - research. In
other words, these institutions focus not on the personal develop-
ment of the individual student, but on theory development. They
are comparable to the graduate departments of other disciplines.
Glendon, for example, cites Owen Fiss who said "'law professors
are not paid to train lawyers, but to study the law and to teach
students what they happen to discover.' 65 While there may be
first-rate teachers at some research institutions who do focus on the
personal development of the students into lawyers, research is the
priority of the institution. (This research priority may be reflected
in areas such as salary, office hours, or tolerance of poor teaching,
to name a few.) Ideally, a research institution will be able to offer
superb teaching, as well as a faculty engaged in public service. At
some point, however, an institution may have to reveal its priori-
ties; it seems undeniable to me that there are institutions - as well
there should be - whose priority is research rather than the
individual student.
One might argue that while some research institutions are
doing a lousy job of teaching, it does not follow that we need
alternative models of law schools. While this argument has appeal,
I ultimately reject it on both pragmatic and theoretical grounds.
On a pragmatic level, I think it unlikely that the legal community
will suddenly decide that the "elite" institutions, many of which are
research institutions, are doing an inadequate job even if their
64. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
65. GLENDON, supra note 2, at 217.
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teaching is deficient. I think it is much more likely that the elite
institutions will set the standard to which other institutions aspire,
and thus increase the likelihood that their strengths are viewed as
desirable and their weaknesses are unimportant. Thus, even if I
might agree with a unitary model for evaluating law schools in
theory, in practice I think that if the elite research institutions are
not setting the model by which some law schools want to be
evaluated, these law schools need an alternative model.
More importantly, however, I am not sure that I do believe
that there should be a unitary model for evaluating law schools.
We live in a world of finite resources, including the number of
hours in the day. Teaching and research can be competing
priorities and sometimes a school (or faculty member) has to
choose between these priorities. Furthermore, because teaching
and research are distinct activities, one should evaluate them
differently. Thus, while I think all law schools will be balancing
teaching, scholarship, and service, I think it makes sense to have
different evaluation standards for a school whose priority is
teaching than one does for a school whose priority is research.
Some individuals may object to evaluating teaching institutions
separately from research institutions because of the difficulty in
evaluating teaching. Moreover, I think it is true that as subjective
as the evaluation of scholarship may be, it probably is even more
difficult to evaluate teaching.
On the other hand, I certainly think one could devise a scheme
that evaluated quantifiable factors related to teaching. While these
factors would not tell the whole story of a teaching institution's
success, they certainly would provide relevant information for a
prospective student and would be an attempt to evaluate an
institution in accordance with the priorities it had set.
The evaluation of teaching institutions, for example, might take
into account factors such as: student-faculty ratios; the average
class size for both required and elective courses; the number of
hours that faculty members are available outside of class to
students; the percentage of students that visit a faculty member
outside of class; the number of writing exercises provided to
students, including the type of feedback, if any, which is provided,
and from whom; the number of live-client clinics; the number of
students with externship opportunities; the number of faculty who
have developed their own course materials or use supplemental
materials of their own; and faculty involvement in co-curricular
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activities, such as moot-court programs and law journals. Hence,
while the quality of such contacts and the benefits to the students
may be difficult to measure, I certainly believe that a school's
dedication to the personal development of the student can be
measured by looking at the opportunities provided to the students,
the identity of those providing such opportunities, and the priority
assigned to these issues by the faculty.
If I could convince US. News to evaluate law school teaching
institutions and research institutions separately next year, they
would have to decide which institutions to evaluate within each
category. One option would be to permit a law school to select the
category in which it is ranked. An alternative option would be to
rank all law schools according to both sets of criteria (although a
listing might only be published for those categories schools indicat-
ed). The latter approach seems fairer since some schools may rank
very high as both teaching institutions and as research institutions.
If my assumption is correct, and some institutions will rank
high as both teaching institutions and research institutions, doesn't
that undercut my thesis that there should be alternative models?
Doesn't that assumption suggest that law schools can do it all and
that we should hold them accountable for both and use a unitary
model for evaluation?
My answer is still no. As stated above, I believe time is 'a
finite resource. Ultimately, each faculty member decides whether
his or her priority is teaching or scholarship. If the priority is
teaching, for example, that professor will engage in activities
because they benefit the student, even though these activities take
time from scholarship. Such a professor, for example, might give
a midterm, or an extra writing assignment. 66 If I am correct, then
in those institutions that are excellent research institutions and
excellent teaching institutions, there may be, in essence, two
different sets of faculty: the faculty whose priority is their research,
analogous to the faculty in a graduate department; and the faculty
66. Just to be clear, I am not saying that such a teacher will not and should not engage
in scholarship. Realistically, however, I think the teaching-oriented professor will do less
scholarship than that person would do if his or her priority was not teaching and the
development of the individual student. Furthermore, I suspect that the scholarship of those
whose priority is teaching may differ in tone from other scholarship because the dedicated
teacher is more likely to be interested in writing to an audience that includes students,
lawyers, and judges.
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whose priority is teaching and the personal development of the
student.
Although there may be law schools that are both excellent
research institutions and excellent teaching institutions, I still
advocate the alternative models approach because I do not think
we should require all law schools to do both. Doing both well
requires strong financial resources and a willingness and ability to
tolerate multiple cultures. While it is wonderful if a law school has
the resources and can support these different cultures, I think it is
also appropriate for a law school to decide that it has finite
resources, that it cannot be all things to all people, to identify
whether its priority is to be a research institution dedicated to
theory development or a teaching institution focusing on the
development of the individual student, and then concentrate on
doing that well. In other words, while I think some institutions
may be able to do it all, I do not think all institutions can do it all.
In sum, although all law schools should and hopefully will
combine good scholarship, good teaching, and public service,
ultimately each school has to decide what its priorities are: each
institution will have to decide whether it is primarily a teaching
institution, whose focus and priority is the personal development of
the individual student; whether it is a research institution, whose
focus and priority is theory development; or whether it grants equal
weight to both. I strongly believe that all faculty, including faculty
at institutions that are primarily teaching institutions, should be
engaged in research. I also strongly believe that we need to have
research institutions whose priority is theory development rather
than personal development of the students. In my view, however,
the fact that we all are combining research, teaching, and scholar-
ship does not mean that it is appropriate to use a unitary model of
evaluation and that a teaching institution should be evaluated
according to how it compares to an elite research institution. I
think there clearly is a difference in focus, there clearly is a need
and a role for both, and not all institutions have the resources to
excel at both.67 What all of us in legal education and the profes-
67. I can imagine an argument that the research institutions should not even bother
teaching students. I disagree with this argument since I think there would be both student
demand and societal need for teaching at the research institution. I would be more inclined
to conclude that perhaps not all faculty at a research institution need to teach (although I
believe that teaching helps one's research by grounding it, just as one's research informs
one's teaching).
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sion must do, I believe, is acknowledge the validity of both kinds
of law schools.
Thus, I would like to see a time in which a law school could
proudly announce that it is a "professional" school, rather than
shirking from that label. I would like legal educators, the legal
profession, and the public to recognize that an alternative model to
the research institution exists that is equally valid, and that a
different set of criteria should be used to evaluate each model. I
would like law schools to publicly announce which primary model
they are following so that prospective students have more complete
disclosure before making a selection. I would like U.S. News next
year to evaluate alternative models of law schools, just as it
evaluates alternative models of medical schools, and just as it
distinguishes between large research universities and small liberal
arts colleges. In short, I hope that the Glendon and Kronman
books, coming as they do from the "elite" end of the academy,
have advanced the day when it is socially acceptable to say that one
teaches at a law school that follows a "professional school" model
and to be proud of that fact.
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